Sources for Plutynski’s All Female Philosophy of Science Syllabus

2015-12-01

Tags: teaching philosophy of science

This week the blog of the Philosophy of Science Association’s Women’s Caucus posted a useful and interesting “experimental” syllabus created by Anya Plutynski. The model syllabus offers a nice overview of core topics in Philosophy of Science, using only female authors.

It’s a little more challenging to incorporate female authors into the early parts of a historically-organized philosophy of science couse, though philosophers like Susan Stebbing and May Brodbeck are worth a look. And there are always secondary sources; I’ve used Margaret Osler’s Reconfiguring the World at the beginning of a course to discuss proto-science and the emergence of modern science. But Anya demonstrates that at least a topically-organized, all-women survey can be uncompromising.

As I started collecting citations for the articles I didn’t have, I thought I’d post all of them, as a supplement to Anya’s work. So, these are the full citations for the readings in her model syllabus, just in case they’re useful to anyone else. Here’s also a link to the same as a (still a bit messy) .bib file for BibTeX/BibLaTeX users.

Sources

Alexandrova, Anna. 2008. “Making Models Count.” Philosophy of Science 75 (3): 383–404.

Alexandrova, Anna. 2015. “Well-Being and Philosophy of Science.” Philosophy Compass 10 (3): 219–231.

Andreasen, Robin O. 2008. “The Concept of Race in Medicine.” In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, edited by Michael Ruse. Oxford University Press.

Ankeny, Rachel A., and Sabina Leonelli. 2011. “What’s so Special about Model Organisms?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2): 313–323.

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1971. Causality and Determination. London: Cambridge University Press.

Ben-Menahem, Yemima. 1990. “The Inference to the Best Explanation.” Erkenntnis 33 (3): 319–344.

Bokulich, Alisa. 2013. “Explanatory Models Versus Predictive Models: Reduced Complexity Modeling in Geomorphology.” In EPSA 11: Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science, 115–128. Springer.

Bokulich, Alisa, and William J. Devlin. 2015. “Kuhn’s Social Epistemology and the Sociology of Science.” In Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions—50 Years On, edited by William J. Devlin and Alisa Bokulich, 167–183. Springer.

Brown, Rachael L. 2014. “What Evolvability Really is.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3): 549–572.

Cartwright, Nancy. 1980a. “Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1-2): 75–84.

Cartwright, Nancy. 1980b. “The Truth Doesn’t Explain Much.” American Philosophical Quarterly: 159–163.

Darden, Lindley. 1976. “Reasoning in Scientific Change: Charles Darwin, Hugo De Vries, and the Discovery of Segregation.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 7 (2): 127–169.

Darden, Lindley, and Nancy Maull. 1977. “Interfield Theories.” Philosophy of Science 44:43–64.

Douglas, Heather. 2000. “Inductive Risk and Values in Science.” Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559–579.

Feest, Uljana. 2014. “Phenomenal Experiences, First-Person Methods, and the Artificiality of Experimental Data.” Philosophy of Science 81 (5): 927–939.

Franklin, Laura R. 2005. “Exploratory Experiments.” Philosophy of Science 72 (5): 888–899.

Gannett, Lisa. 1999. “What’s in a Cause?: The Pragmatic Dimensions of Genetic Explanations.”Biology and Philosophy 14 (3): 349–373.

Hesse, Mary. 1966. Models and Analogies in Science. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Ismael, Jenann. 2013. “Causation, Free Will, and Naturalism.” In Scientific Metaphysics, edited by Harold Kincaid, James Ladyman, and Don Ross, 208–235.

Lloyd, Elisabeth A. 2015. “Model Robustness as a Confirmatory Virtue: The Case of Climate Science.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:58–68.

Lloyd, Elisabeth A, and Carl G. Anderson. 1993. “Empiricism, Objectivity, and Explanation.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1): 121–131.

Longino, Helen E. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mayo, Deborah G. 1988. “Toward a More Objective Understanding of the Evidence of Carcinogenic Risk.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:489–503.

Mayo, Deborah G., and Aris Spanos. 2006. “Philosophical Scrutiny of Evidence of Risks: From Bioethics to Bioevidence.” Philosophy of Science 73 (5): 803–816.

Millstein, Roberta L. 2006. “Natural Selection as a Population-Level Causal Process.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4): 627–653.

Mitchell, Sandra. 2000. “Dimensions of Scientific Law.” Philosophy of Science 67:242–265.

Morrison, Margaret, and Mary S. Morgan. 1999. “Models as Mediating Instruments.” In Models as mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, edited by Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison, vol. 52. Cambridge University Press.

Nersessian, Nancy J. 1999. “Model-Based Reasoning in Conceptual Change.” In Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, 5–22. Springer.

Parke, Emily C. 2014. “Experiments, Simulations, and Epistemic Privilege.” Philosophy of Science 81 (4): 516–536.

Patton, Lydia. 2012. “Experiment and Theory Building.” Synthese 184 (3): 235–246.

Potochnik, Angela. 2010. “Levels of Explanation Reconceived.” Philosophy of Science 77 (1):59–72.

Richardson, Sarah S. 2010. “Sexes, Species, and Genomes: Why Males and Females Are Not like Humans and Chimpanzees.” Biology & Philosophy 25 (5): 823–841.

Solomon, Miriam. 1994. “Multivariate Models of Scientific Change.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994, 287–297.

Thalos, Mariam. 2002. “Explanation is a Genus: An Essay on the Varieties of Scientific Explanation.” Synthese 130 (3): 317–354.

Wilkenfeld, Daniel A., Dillon Plunkett, and Tania Lombrozo. 2015. “Depth and Deference: When and Why We Attribute Understanding.” Philosophical Studies (online, forthcoming in print).

Woody, Andrea I. 2014. “Chemistry’s Periodic Law: Rethinking Representation and Explanation after the Turn to Practice.” In Science After the Practice Turn in the Philosophy, History, and Social Studies of Science, 123–150. New York: Routledge.

Wylie, Alison, and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. 2007. “Coming to Terms with the Values of Science: Insights from Feminist Science Studies Scholarship” in Value-Free Science? Ideals and Illusions, edited by Harold Kincaid, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie. Oxford University Press.